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Intelligent Building Systems: Security and Facility Professionals’ Understanding of System
Threats, Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Practice
David J Brooks, Michael Coole & Paul Haskell-Dowland
ABSTRACT
Intelligent Buildings or Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS) are becoming common in
buildings, driven by the commercial need for functionality, sharing of information, reduced costs and
sustainable buildings. The facility manager often has BACS responsibility; however, their focus is generally
not on BACS security. Nevertheless, if a BACS manifested threat is realized the impact to a building can
be significant, through denial, loss or manipulation of the building and its services, resulting in loss of
information or occupancy. Therefore, this study garnered a descriptive understanding of security and
facility professionals’ knowledge of BACS, including vulnerabilities and mitigation practices.
Results indicate that the majority of security and facility professionals hold a general awareness of BACS
security issues, although they lacked a robust understanding to meet necessary protection. For instance,
understanding of 23 BACS vulnerabilities were found to be equally critical with limited variance.
Mitigation strategies were no better, with respondents indicating poor threat diagnosis. In contrast,
cybersecurity and technical security professionals such as integrators or security engineering design
professionals displayed a robust understanding of BACS vulnerabilities and resulting mitigation strategies.
Findings support the need for greater awareness for both security management and facility professionals
of BACS vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies.
Keywords: Intelligent, smart, cybersecurity, risk, threat, mitigation, professional, convergence
INTRODUCTION
Intelligent Buildings or more accurately, Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS) is a system that
integrates many disparate building systems and services, such as HVAC, lighting and security systems.
These systems are becoming more embedded into the built environment and its buildings. Today, BACS
technology and its connectivity extends beyond just the large high rise commercial building, adopted by
small commercial and some domestic buildings. The applications of BACS are driven by the cumulative
commercial need for increasing functionality and the seamless flow of information across an organisation,
with the aim to reduce enterprise operating costs and provide a more time responsive building. Increased
application of BACS can be shown through a market that has an expected compound annual growth of
between 15 to 34 percent, to an estimated value of US$104 billion by 2020 (Marketsandmarkets, 2017;
Technavio, 2016; TMR Analysis, 2017). With global rises in energy costs and greater government
sanctions, BACS are likely to be at the forefront of future buildings (Brooks, Coole, Haskell-Dowland,
Griffith & Lockhart, 2018b, p. i).
BACS, as building infrastructure, are generally owned and operated by facility professionals or building
owners/operators. Building owners/operators primary foci are the drivers of cost efficacy and
functionality that a modern BACS offers (Frost & Sullivan, 2008); however, BACS are also used by many
other organisational departments. For example, the technology of BACS lies across multiple departments,
including Information Technology and Communications (ITC) on which the corporate network facilitates
the flow of BACS information and security (Brooks, et al., 2018b), where security systems such as access
control and surveillance often converge.
1

The technology spread of BACS throughout all parts of a building, with multiple owners and users, leaves
these systems open to associated security risks (Brooks, et al., 2018a). BACS are designed predominately
from a commercial perspective and primarily operated by facility engineering professionals, who may
have a limited focus on the security of the business and its built environment. Yet it can be argued that
the security of such technologies is a significant business concern and therefore, the security strategies
to mitigate risks against breaches of confidentiality, integrity and availability within the BACS context
should be embedded in the organisational culture. If a BACS threat is realized, it can have a significant
impact on the organisation, resulting in consequences such as loss of information to extended loss of
occupancy.
Nevertheless, the level of awareness and understanding of the various professionals responsible for
protecting BACS is not well known. With the increasing use, functionality and connectivity of BACS and
their exploitable vulnerabilities in the built environment, the security and facility professionals require
greater understanding to support sound risk mitigation strategies. Therefore, this article puts forward the
following Research Question:
What are the security and facility professionals’ knowledge of BACS, their vulnerabilities and
criticalities, and resulting security mitigation practices?
SECURITY OF BUILDING AUTOMATION
BACS are not just a convergence of a building’s plant and equipment; rather, they are an information
system. BACS are usually spread throughout a facility and across all levels of its communication networks,
with the objective of cross-system connectivity. Consequently, many groups within an organization have,
or should have, some level of BACS responsibility, but that is not always understood. Furthermore, these
systems are becoming more interconnected and integrated with additional services and business
applications. For example, the function of security and its associated technology is currently and will be
more so, subsumed into BACS.
Issues such as the legacy of BACS technologies, remote access and interconnectivity raise the security
considerations of BACS. For example, King (2016) points out that early generations of BACS were
developed using discrete devices/protocols, and subsequently built upon and added to, rather than reengineered with security as an underlying design principle (Sinopoli, 2012). Since “these service-based
systems were not initially interconnected, they were not designed with logical security as a paramount
concern or requirement” (King, 2016). Isolating BACS from external networks may mitigate remote
attacks, but does not address the security vulnerabilities resulting from physical access to the automation
network. As Sinopoli (2012) suggests, a localised attack is potentially much more dangerous and difficult
to deal with. Vulnerabilities of BACS may also be public knowledge through hacker-run searchable
websites such as www.shodan.io, which publicises known BACS vulnerabilities.
BACS are comprised of an architectural structure incorporating various levels of equipment and devices,
which may be prone to nefarious exploitation. Such vulnerabilities expose the organisation to risks that
may ripple throughout the whole organisation, resulting in substantial and far reaching impacts. Although
in many cases the protection of BACS is not in the domain of most security management professionals,
excluding cybersecurity, as their roles are heavily focused towards administrative duties and responding
to incidents, they are arguably becoming more invested as their security systems and functions are
becoming embedded in BACS. Furthermore, the ability of the organisation to occupy and operate in their

2

building are becoming more tied to BACS. Therefore, security professionals must demonstrate a sound
understanding of the security concerns such a technological shift brings.
Nevertheless, technical security professionals are generally aware of the vulnerabilities associated with
intruder alarms, access control systems, surveillance systems and other security technologies, and the
various technical and procedural methodologies for countering these threats. However, cognizance must
now transfer to their organisation’s BACS. Currently, there is limited literature investigating the security
management professionals understanding of BACS or providing specific BACS guidance aimed at this
group. In contrast, there is a plethora of cybersecurity literature, aimed at professionals who have a high
level of computing and networking technical knowledge. Therefore, contemporary security and facility
management professionals need to have a comparative awareness and understanding of BACS, their
vulnerabilities and appropriate mitigation strategies.
DEFINING BUILDING AUTOMATION
The concept of BACS developed to mean “the execution by a machine agent (usually a computer) of a
function that was previously carried out by a human” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Automation may be
defined as the “use or introduction of automatic equipment in a manufacturing or other process or
facility” (Simpson & Weiner, 1989). Automation provides the drive for ever more cost effective, efficient
and reliable solutions through the gradual removal of the human. It is acknowledged that with repetitive
processes, the automated alternative to human labour is cheaper, more responsive, consistent and less
prone to error (Sall, 2017).
BACS integrates building services, such as utilities, with each other to exchange digital, analogue or other
forms of information, potentially to a central control point for monitoring and action. Building services
are utilities that are supplied and distributed within a building that may include electricity, gas, heating,
ventilation, cooling (HVAC), water and communications (ISO, 2004, p. 6). To facilitate such control,
computers and controllers in BACS are networked for peer to peer control. In addition, the BACS
controllers have their own internal processors, supporting autonomous operations (High Performance
HVAC, 2017).
Today, BACS may be known by many terms such as a Building Automation System, Facilities Management
System, Energy Management System, Building Management System, Intelligent Building, and more
recently, Smart Buildings. A more precise term is Building Automation and Control System (BACS),
supported by the literature such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, 2007a).
However, the core principles of BACS remain the same, regardless of its name. Given that the building
automation industry in which BACS operate in is dynamic, these terms are often used interchangeably,
and there is no single consensus that defines BACS.
Building Automation Fundamentals
BACS are modular in nature, formed from the integration of a number of devices connected and
communicating on a common platform. The system’s architecture contains three distinct levels (CIBSE,
2000), considered Management, Automation and Field Device levels (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. BACS Architecture (Brooks, et al., 2018b, p. 200)
In general, the Management level consists of the Information Technology and Communications (ITC)
network, with connected “operator stations, monitoring and operator units, programming units and
other peripheral computer devices connected to a data processing device i.e., a server” (ISO, 2004, p. 53).
In addition, one or a number of data and information processing (software) packages enables a human
system interface. Software packages range from simple information processing systems that control a
single room via the internet to complex whole of building services, running not only the building plant
and equipment, but also security, energy management, lighting and other services.
The Automation level is generally a dedicated communications network for the sole purpose of
equipment and device connectivity, communication and control. The Automation level is comprised of
“control devices and monitoring and operator units, programming units, operator stations or panels as
well as programming units connected to a data processing device i.e., a server” (ISO, 2004, p. 53). This
level is associated with Controllers that serve primary plant and equipment, including air handling units,
chillers, boiler units and other plant and equipment.
The Field device level provides physical devices, such as sensors or activators connected to specific plant
and equipment. These devices connect the BACS to its physical environment. Examples of field level
devices include light switches, PIR detectors, fans, temperature sensors and valves.
Finally, for BACS to function there is a requirement for common language connectivity, achieved through
standardised communication protocols at each or across its three architectural network levels. Currently,
no particular protocol exists for all BACS; however, common protocols include BACnet, LonWorks,
Modbus, KNX, Internet Protocol (IP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), to name a few (Schneider
Electric, 2015; Sharples, Callaghan, & Clarke, 1999).
Building Automation Vulnerabilities
The high level of connectivity and the spread of devices throughout a building that is typical of a
contemporary BACS results in a degree of embedded vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries.
The most significant vulnerabilities are considered to be physical access to the Automation level devices
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and its communications network (Brooks, 2013; Sinopoli, 2012). The consequences of realized threats for
BACS can be divided into three categories (Figure 2) of loss, denial or manipulation (Assante & Lee, 2015,
p. 11) to control and monitoring (Brooks, et al., 2018b, p. 199). These consequences pose a significant risk
to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the organisation’s information, buildings and other
business elements.

Denial

Loss

of Monitor
of Control

Manipulation

Figure 2. BACS Consequences to Realized Threats
(Brooks, et al., 2018b, p. 125; Assante & Lee, 2015, p. 11)
The BACS Automation level provides the necessary connectivity and communications between the many
field devices and equipment (for example, a light) to the Management level (for example, how and when
the light is used). The Automation level typically applies an open industry communications protocol
(Shang et al., 2014, p. 51) between devices and gateways. In practice, the Automation level is an industrial
control network, designed, installed and maintained by facility engineers and installers or integrators.
Data generated at this level is normally distributed across its entire system network.
The automation communications network is the core of a BACS, providing facility and device-wide
connectivity. However such connectivity, including embedded data entry access points, results in a degree
of vulnerability that can be exploited. The Automation level vulnerabilities range from physical access to
devices (Controllers) to highly technical remote cyber-attack (Brooks, et al., 2018a; Wyman, 2017).
Unlike the Automation level, both the Management and Field Device levels are less prone to exploitable
vulnerabilities. At the Management level, an assumption exists that in part, the Information Technology
professionals provides a commensurate level of cybersecurity protection. At the Field level, devices are
isolated and realized threats generally result in restricted and somewhat isolated impacts. Management
level vulnerabilities range from physical access to workstations to remote hacking via the corporate
network. Whereas, the Field level vulnerabilities range from device destruction to remote control.
Generic risks to BACS can be presented at the architectural levels, which provide oversight of the more
significant and critical risks. According to Brooks, et al., (2018b), the most significant critical and high risks
(red and orange) lie within the Automation level, followed by moderate risks (yellow) at the Management
level, and low (green) risks at the Field Device level.
Table 1 Generic BACS Risks
BACS Architectural levels
Field Device

Automation
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Management

Device

Low Risk

Critical Risk

Moderate Risk

Network

Low Risk

High Risk

Moderate Risk

Software (Application)

Very Low Risk

High Risk

Moderate Risk

(Brooks, et al., 2018b, p. 125)
MATERIALS AND METHOD
To uncover practitioner comprehension and practice relating to BACS security vulnerabilities and
mitigations, this project applied a critical literature critique followed by an online survey. The online
survey was sent to 13,803 randomly selected security and building owner/operator professionals from
ASIS International, Building Owners and Operators Association (BOMA), and the Security Industry
Association (SIA) memberships (see Table 2). The total response rate was 2.4 percent (n = 331).
Table 2. Survey Response Rates and Distribution
Association

Population2

Distributed

Response

Rate (%)

35,000
ASIS International
5379
2401
3.06%
1,000
Security Industry Association (SIA)
2469
Building Owners & Operators
10,000
5955
91
1.53%
Association (BOMA)
46,000
Overall
13,803
331
2.40%
Note: 1. Respondents noted their professional practice area, resulting in not being to identify their
security association membership. Therefore, the security associations are a combined data set. 2. BOMA
and SIA are based on organisational membership, resulting in an estimation of members.
The survey consisted of 18 questions and gathered data on respondents’ role, understanding, and
knowledge of BACS vulnerabilities and mitigation practices. The survey contained mixed response
questions, including yes/no, Likert and self-response open questions. Data were collected as both
quantitative measures and qualitative self-directed text. The survey followed a logic path, which at certain
points removed respondents from having to address certain questions that they felt they did not
understand. This approach provided a number of benefits, such as removing respondents whose poor
understanding of a particular question might result in random responses, as well as reducing completion
time.
Respondents were first asked their job function, including Security, Building Owner/Operator, Consultant
or Other. Depending upon the response, a selection of job roles related to the selected job function was
displayed. Respondents were then asked whether they were aware of the different levels of BACS
architecture. Those who responded yes were asked to rate their level of understanding of each of the
three architecture levels on a Likert scale from very low to very high. Respondents who indicated that
they did not have an understanding of BACS architecture were directed to later questions.
All respondents were asked whether or not BACS vulnerabilities featured in their group risk register. They
also rated, on a Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree, with a further ‘don’t know’ option), the
positive impact of BACS with a free text field for positive and negative impacts. Respondents were also
asked whether or not they were responsible for a BACS. Those that indicated yes were asked about their
role in relation to BACS security. All respondents were asked whether security systems were integrated
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with BACS, and which systems these were. Finally, respondents rated the level of criticality of 23 BACS
vulnerabilities on a 7-point Likert scale; the levels at which they applied different mitigation strategies;
and which stakeholder groups they engaged with.
RESULTS
The collected survey data was analysed using a variety of statistical techniques to gain an understanding
of professional awareness of BACS security. Respondents came from 38 nation states, with the majority
from the Unites States (73%), followed by the United Kingdom (5%) and Canada (4%). The assumption
was that BOMA and SIA respondents, given their geographical membership, had a higher proportion of
United States respondents. However, ASIS gained respondents from a wider geographic sample. The
majority of respondents undertook a security function (72%), with building owners and operators
accounting for the remainder (28%).
Security & Building Professionals Awareness
Two-thirds (75%) of respondents believed that they had an awareness of the various hardware and logical
levels of BACS architecture. Such awareness was further supported by the overall median understanding
of the three BACS architecture levels, which was reported as being “somewhat high”. Furthermore, 45
percent of the respondents stated that BACS vulnerabilities are included in their group risk register. The
inclusion of BACS into a risk register was reported by 27 percent of building owner/operators and 41
percent of security professionals.
Nevertheless, such a high level of confidence in awareness and an almost 50 percent inclusion of BACS
vulnerabilities in risk registers was contradicted by the assessed criticality of BACS vulnerabilities across
all 23 assessed BACS vulnerabilities. The BACS vulnerabilities were viewed as being of relatively equal
criticality. In addition, that there was little or no difference (M = 5.82, SD = 1.75 to M = 4.81, SD = 1.76)
between vulnerabilities. In other words, physical access to the controller or manipulation of a sensor or
actuator were of an equal criticality as a cyber-attack on a Management level device. Despite 75 percent
of respondents reporting they had an awareness of BACS architecture, the neutral (and arguably
inappropriate) responses suggest that many respondents did not understand the criticality of the BACS
vulnerabilities.
The lack of differentiation between the criticality of BACS vulnerabilities also persisted within the job
function groups, although some differences were found in the significance weighting between these
groups. For example, building owners or operators indicated 59 percent of BACS vulnerabilities were
critical, as opposed to 33 percent of security professionals. Such variance suggested culturally defined
differences in the perception of BACS between the various professional groups.
Greater accuracy in the perception of the BACS vulnerabilities were found to be held by the more
technical practitioners (M = 5.14, SD = 1.73 to M = 2.57, SD = 1.76). This group included integrators and
cybersecurity professionals, making up an expert group (n = 10) who demonstrated an awareness of the
different criticalities of BACS vulnerabilities. The group’s mean perceptions of the criticality of the
different BACS vulnerabilities aligned with the findings from the literature, which concluded that the
greater risks lie in the Automation level with the BACS Controller.
Level of Professional Responsibilities
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When respondents were asked whether they are responsible for a BACS, the overall level of responsibility
was found to be low (15%). Among those indicating that they are responsible for a BACS were 36 percent
of building owner or operators and 10 percent of security professionals. These results indicated that there
was little direct responsibility for BACS and given that 75 percent of participants claimed some awareness
of BACS architecture, this suggested greater use than responsibility among the professionals.
BACS responsibility within each job function group was supported by the additional finding that 33
percent of all building owners or operators, and 7 percent of all security professionals surveyed, indicated
that they:
1. Regularly discuss potential vulnerabilities within their BACS with other managers;
2. Regularly work with, manage, oversee, or make recommendations relating to a BACS; and
3. Regularly provide protective advice in regard to BACS vulnerabilities.
Together, these findings indicated that responsibility for BACS was largely outside the security
professionals’ responsibilities; rather, with a relatively small group of building owners or operators.
Security Integration into BACS
When the degree of security system integration into BACS was examined, the results indicated that half
(51%) had some security system integration. Although this suggested that there is currently a reasonable
level of security system integration into BACS, the data provided limited understating of the level and
type of security integration. Of concern was the difference in the level of security system integration
between the security professionals (52% reporting integration) and building owners or operators (19%
reporting integration). These differences further support the suggestion of culturally defined differences
arising from occupational perspectives of BACS.
Respondents who reported BACS security systems integration were also asked about the types of security
systems. The systems reported as being integrated were found to differ between the job function groups,
further suggesting a culturally defined focus on different aspects of either BACS or security systems. For
example, security professionals primarily reported duress (62%), intruder alarm (60%), CCTV (51%) and
electronic access control (51%) as being the most common integrated security systems. In contrast,
building owners or operator professionals primarily selected other (60%), and reported non-security
related systems such as HVAC, fire systems and lift control (Table 3).
Table 3. Security System Reported Integration with BACS by Function
Building
Security
Total
Owner/Operator
Electronic access control
19%
51%
26%
CCTV
14%
51%
19%
Intruder alarm
11%
60%
13%
Security lighting
19%
39%
15%
Duress
8%
63%
9%
Incident reporting
7%
40%
6%
Intercom
24%
29%
8%
Radios
17%
33%
2%
1
Other
60%
0%
2%
Note: 1. Other systems reported: HVAC, fire systems and lift control
Systems
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The security systems of duress (8% to 63%; n = 52), intruder alarm (11% to 60%; n =49), CCTV (14% to
51%; n = 37) and electronic access control (19% to 51%; n = 32) had a diverse response to BACS
“integration” between the professional groups. Such variation in the understanding indicates that
integration means different things to different professionals. For example, is the “once only” entry of staff
employment information that subsequently propagates through the enterprise system into the security
access card considered integration? In contrast, is a hard-wired connection between systems integration?
This outcome highlights definitional and semantic issues that results in the ability to define BACS and
integration as problematic. As such, the data provides a limited understating of the level of security
integration into BACS.
Most Critical BACS Vulnerabilities
When respondents were asked to rate the criticality of 23 BACS vulnerabilities, the mean criticality rating
of each vulnerability was relatively equal. Although two-thirds of respondents indicated an awareness of
BACS architecture, this contradicted the overall mean responses to the criticality of different
vulnerabilities across the BACS Automation, Management and Field device levels. The results indicated a
perception of equivalence of criticality for all BACS vulnerabilities (Figures 3 and 4), which also persisted
when each job function group was examined individually. For example, approximately 60 percent of
building owners or operators in a simplified 2-scale analysis rated all vulnerabilities as significant, followed
by 30 percent of security professionals. Equivalence of responses to all vulnerabilities are displayed with
trend lines.
These results display how each professional group provided a homogenous rating to the BACS
vulnerabilities. The perception of equality of vulnerabilities demonstrated a lack of robust understanding
of which BACS hardware or software is likely to be more or less vulnerable than other parts. Importantly,
it indicates a lack of understanding of which parts of the BACS architecture are more critical to maintain
operations, and may therefore require greater protection.
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Automation network traffic data injection
Damaging a Controller
No tamper detection on Controllers
Insertion of an unauthorized Controller
Cyber-attack on the Management level device
Unauthorized programming of a Controller
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Figure 3. Perceived Criticality Significance of BACS Vulnerabilities by Building Owner or Operators

10

Manual override of Controllers output switches
Automation network traffic monitoring
Extraction of a Controller's latent memory
Tampering with the Automation network
Overriding a Controller outputs or inputs
Automation network traffic data injection
Damaging a Controller

No tamper detection on Controllers
Insertion of an unauthorized Controller
Cyber-attack on the Management level device
Unauthorized programming of a Controller
Damage a Management level device
Damaging a Sensor or Actuator
Unauthorized access to Workstation
Automation level open source network programs
Loss of mains power
Manipulation of Security sensor (Detector)
Physical disconnection of a Sensor or Actuator
Tampering with the ICT network
Monitoring the ICT network
Insertion of an unauthorized Management level…
Manipulation of a Sensor or Actuator
Physical access to a controller
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Signigicant

Not Significant

Figure 4. Perceived Criticality Significance of BACS Vulnerabilities by Security
Expert BACS Group
The expert group, consisting of cybersecurity and technical security professionals such as integrators or
security engineering design specialists, provided criticality ratings of the 23 BACS vulnerabilities and
displayed a greater awareness in variation (Figure 5). As Figure 5 indicates with a trend line, unlike the
other job function group figures (see Figures 3 and 4) there is a distinct difference between the most
significant and least significant critical vulnerability.
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Figure 5. Perceived Criticality Significance of BACS Vulnerabilities by the Expert Group
Examination of the mean and median criticality of each vulnerability (see Table 4) revealed that the expert
group demonstrated the greatest level of awareness of BACS vulnerabilities, rating manual override of
Controller output switches as the most critical vulnerability. In contrast, security professionals cited cyberattack on the Management level device as the most critical BACS vulnerability, while building owners or
operators cited tampering with the Automation network.
Significantly, the expert group also expressed a wider range of criticality ratings to BACS vulnerabilities
(34.4% difference between least and most critical) when compared with building owners or operators
(18%) and security professionals (19%). These differences further supported the view that the expert
group held the most accurate and nuanced understanding of BACS vulnerabilities. For example, the
majority of critical concerns were located at the BACS architectural level of Automation.
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Although this expert group was small (n = 10), they nevertheless held congruent views. For example,
vulnerabilities such as insertion of a rogue Controller and unauthorized programming of the Controller
were rated as a relatively low criticality, opposing the findings of the literature review (Table 4).
Table 4. Expert Group Ratings of Criticality of BACS Vulnerabilities in Highest Order
Level
Automation
Field
Automation
Automation
Automation
Management
Field
Automation
Management
Automation
Automation
Management
Automation
Field
Automation
Automation
Management
Automation
Automation
Management
Management
Field
Field

Expert Group

Mean

Median

SD

Manual override of Controllers output switches
Automation network traffic monitoring
Automation network traffic data injection
Automation level open source network programs
Physical access to a controller
Insertion of an unauthorized Management level
device
Physical disconnection of a Sensor or Actuator
Tampering with the Automation network
Monitoring the ICT network
No tamper detection on Controllers
Insertion of an unauthorized Controller
Unauthorized access to Workstation
Extraction of a Controller's latent memory
Damaging a Sensor or Actuator
Unauthorized programming of a Controller
Overriding a Controller outputs or inputs
Tampering with the ICT network
Loss of mains power
Damaging a Controller
Cyberattack on the Management level device
Damage a Management level device
Manipulation of a Sensor or Actuator
Manipulation of Security sensor (Detector)

4.63
4.38
4.25
4.11
3.89

6
4.5
4.5
5
4

2.12
2.23
1.85
2.08
1.91

3.78

5

2.15

3.78
3.75
3.75
3.56
3.56
3.44
3.43
3.38
3.22
3.22
3.13
3.11
3.11
3
3
2.88
2.22

4
4
4
4
4
5
4
3
4
3
2.5
1
3
1
3.5
2.5
1

1.81
2.38
2.05
1.95
1.95
2.22
2.19
1.93
2.04
2.2
2.2
2.47
2.08
2.26
1.73
1.9
1.69

To assess statistically significant differences between the mean vulnerability perceptions of the security
management, building owners or operator and expert groups, a one-way ANOVA between groups was
undertaken. Using ANOVA enabled a comparison of the effect of role function (building
owners/operators, security and expert group) on the criticality of 23 BACS vulnerabilities. Before
undertaking the ANOVA, an inspection of skewness, kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk statistics indicated that the
assumption of normality was supported for each group, and Levene’s statistic was non-significant,
indicating homogeneity of variance was not violated. These tests indicated that no statistical assumptions
related to running an ANOVA had been violated.
The results of the ANOVA indicated statistically significant differences between groups for 14 of the 23
BACS vulnerabilities, indicating that the level of criticality was influenced by role function for these
vulnerabilities. Hochberg’s GT2 (α = 0.05) was selected as the post-hoc test, being more robust to the
large differences between group sample sizes. The results of the Hochberg’s post-hoc analysis revealed
that building owners or operators and security management professionals generally perceived BACS
vulnerabilities as more critical than the expert group.
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The ANOVA results indicated that significant vulnerabilities with the largest magnitude of difference
between the group’s mean scores were those that the expert group rated as less critical than the other
two groups, such as Manipulation of Security sensor (Detector) and Cyber-attack on the Management
level device. Those vulnerabilities with no significant difference were those the expert group rated as
more critical (and therefore closer to the consistent high ratings of the other two groups).
The difference between the groups is displayed (Table 5) by comparing the median vulnerability ratings
for building owners (5.5 to 7), security professionals (5 to 6.5) and the expert group (1 to 6).
Table 5. Difference in BACS Vulnerability by Group
BACS Vulnerability

Cyberattack on the Management level device
Manipulation of Security sensor (Detector)
Loss of mains power
Tampering with the ICT network
Manipulation of a Sensor or Actuator
Overriding a Controller outputs or inputs
Damaging a Controller
Damaging a Sensor or Actuator
Damage a Management level device
Unauthorized programming of a Controller
Tampering with the Automation network
No tamper detection on Controllers
Insertion of an unauthorized Controller
Physical access to a controller
Monitoring the ICT network
Extraction of a Controller's latent memory
Physical disconnection of a Sensor or Actuator
Automation network traffic monitoring
Automation network traffic data injection
Unauthorized access to Workstation
Insertion of an unauthorized Management level
device
Automation level open source network
programs
Manual override of Controllers output switches

Security

Building
Owner/Operator

Expert Group

Median
6.5
6
5
5
5
6
6
6
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
6

SD
1.67
1.77
1.97
1.59
1.71
1.9
1.86
1.78
1.85
1.86
1.98
1.89
2.06
1.91
1.78
1.87
1.92
1.74
2
1.63

Median
7
7
6
6
6
6.5
6
5.5
6
7
7
6
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

SD
1.68
1.75
1.95
1.65
1.8
1.41
1.96
1.95
1.77
1.74
1.53
1.9
2.03
2.05
1.99
2.08
1.94
1.83
1.84
1.94

Median
1
1
1
2.5
2.5
3
3
3
3.5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4.5
4.5
5

SD
2.26
1.69
2.47
2.2
1.9
2.2
2.08
1.93
1.73
2.04
2.38
1.95
1.95
1.91
2.05
2.19
1.81
2.23
1.85
2.22

6

1.89

7

1.97

5

2.15

5

1.87

6

1.48

5

2.08

6

1.75

6

1.9

6

2.12

BACS Mitigation Strategies
When asked which mitigation strategies were generally applied to BACS, respondents who identified
themselves as security management professionals indicated the greatest level of practice and application
of mitigation strategies (42%), followed by building owners or operators (25%). As with the BACS critical
vulnerabilities, the majority of respondents generally rated the mitigation strategies as being relatively
equal and with limited variance. For example, the security management professionals demonstrated a
variance of 4 percent, building owners or operators a variance of 5 percent, and the expert group
demonstrating the highest variance at 12 percent.
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In order to determine whether there was statistical significant relationships between role function and
the BACS application of each mitigation strategy, given the categorical nature of the mitigation strategy
data a Pearson's chi-square test of contingencies (α = 0.05) was selected. The chi-square test was found
to be statistically significant for the application of guidelines and standards [χ2 (4, N = 154) = 23.9, p <
.001, V = 0.28], suggesting that the expert group were significantly more likely to apply guidelines and
standards at the Field and Automation levels than the Management level. Likewise, this finding also
suggested that security management professionals and building owner operators were significantly more
likely to apply this mitigation strategy at the Management level.
The chi-square test was also statistically significant for physical security [χ2 (4, N = 156) = 24.5, p < .001, V
= 0.28], indicating that the expert group were significantly more likely to apply physical security mitigation
strategies at the Automation level, whereas security management professionals and building owner
operators were significantly more likely to apply this mitigation strategy at the Field and Management
levels.
The degree of application of each mitigation strategy was then calculated for each job function, to
determine whether there were any discernible differences between the respondents within each group.
Results indicated that security management professionals, as would be expected, believed they apply the
greatest level of security mitigation strategies; however, given the low level of their BACS responsibilities
and neutral understanding of BACS critical vulnerabilities, this finding may be unreliable. A similar
assumption may be applied to building owners or operators.
When the expert group’s assessment of the mitigation strategies were isolated, it identified that they
produced a similar conclusion (Table 6) to that drawn from the literature. For example, the most selected
mitigation strategies by the expert group were security risk assessment, threat assessment, procedures,
security awareness and continuity planning. The mitigation strategy of security risk assessment and threat
assessment may be assimilated under security risk management, which may also include criticality
assessment. However, there was a relatively low variance between the highest (52%) to the lowest (41%)
applied strategy, with a relatively consistent agreement between respondents.
Table 6. Average Mitigation Strategy Application by Expert Group

Mitigation Strategy
Procedures
Threat assessment
Security risk assessment
Continuity planning
Security awareness
ITC security
Guidelines/Standards
Policy
Recovery planning
Maintenance
Emergency response
Tamper detection
Auditing
Electronic access control

Expert Group
Average %
SD (between levels
Strategy Applied
of application)
52%
0.94
52%
0.94
52%
1.25
52%
1.25
52%
1.7
48%
0.94
48%
1.25
48%
1.89
48%
1.89
44%
0.82
44%
1.41
44%
2.16
44%
2.16
41%
1.25
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Intruder alarm
Personnel security
Physical security

41%
41%
41%

1.7
1.7
2.05

BUILDING AUTOMATION SECURITY AWARENESS
The study posed the following Research Question: What are the security and facility professionals’
comprehension of BACS, their vulnerabilities and criticalities, and resulting security mitigation practices?
In response, findings indicate that security management focused professionals and building owners or
operators have limited technical understanding of the vulnerabilities and resulting security strategies
necessary within a risk framework to protect buildings from BACS exploitation. Findings suggest that these
two groups need to take guidance from the “expert” group of cybersecurity and technical security
professionals in BACS security. The expert group had a more robust understanding of the vulnerabilities
and resulting security strategies. Embedding their understanding into a risk framework for decisionmaking provides a more effective building protection from BACS exploitation.
Expert Group Membership
There were three distinct groups identified, being the expert group which comprises of (1) cybersecurity
professionals, and (2) technical physical security professionals which includes integrators and engineering
and design specialists, and (3) the security management and building owners or operator professionals.
As discussed, the expert group cluster displayed a robust understanding of BACS vulnerabilities and
resulting mitigations strategies. It is argued that this expert group held a higher level of technical
understanding than the security management and building owners or operator groups due to the
cumulative results of a number of factors, commencing with their greater technical training, generally in
electrical and electronics engineering, and knowledge. Such technical knowledge underpins their ability
to comprehend systems, displayed with most working on systems such as BACS but also IT networks and
the many security technologies. Furthermore, for the past decade or more there has been a slow but
progressive convergence of technologies that are both computer controlled and operated over computer
networks. The sum of technical training, and knowledge and experience on technical systems, resulted in
the expert group displaying such a greater level of BACS security understanding.
BACS Vulnerabilities and Criticalities
Building owners or operator professionals were found to have a greater level of BACS responsibilities,
higher than security management professionals; however, overall there was an indication of greater use
of BACS than direct portfolio responsibility among the managerial professions. Regardless of the level of
responsibility, security managers and building owners and operators demonstrated limited understanding
of the technical significance of BACS vulnerabilities and therefore, the appropriate mitigation strategies
required to protect against malicious interference. This lack of understanding is significant, as those
responsible for and interacting with BACS did not appear to appreciate their deficiency of knowledge in
this area.
For the awareness of threats and risks associated with BACS, the study found that security management
and building owners or operator professionals demonstrated a discordant connection between their
expressed understanding of threats and risks, and the revealed understanding. Although 75 percent of
security management and builder owners or operator professionals claimed to have an awareness of
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BACS architecture and 48 percent feature BACS vulnerabilities in their group risk register, the majority of
these professionals displayed a limited technical understanding of the criticality of BACS vulnerabilities.
For example, most security management and builder owners or operator professionals rated the
criticality of each BACS vulnerability relatively equally and with limited distinction. Such ratings indicated
that a blanket approach of considering all vulnerabilities to be equally critical was generally applied by
these two professional groups.
In contrast, the expert group of cybersecurity and technical security professionals such as integrators or
security engineering design professionals displayed a much more diverse and accurate understanding of
BACS vulnerabilities. This group indicated that some vulnerabilities, particularly at the Automation level,
were more critical than others. Their understanding of critical BACS vulnerabilities correctly identified the
greater risks as laying in the Automation level Controller (Brooks, 2013; Brooks, et al., 2018b; Granzer,
Praus, & Kastner, 2009), a view which concurs with the literature.
A lack of awareness, knowledge and understanding of BACS vulnerabilities may be attributed to
definitional issues based on role functions and the type of interaction with BACS. For example, diverse
views on what types of security systems integrate into BACS are directed by the professional group being
asked. Security professionals cited the most common BACS integrated security system as duress, intruder
alarm, CCTV, and electronic access control. However, building owners or operator professionals cited
intercom, electronic access control, lighting, radios, and CCTV as the most common BACS integrated
security systems. The understanding of integration between security and builder owners or operator
professionals lacks definition, likely leading to misunderstanding. The study also found that half of all
reported BACS had integrated security systems. Although such security systems integration into BACS is
likely too significantly increase in the future, the ability to define BACS is problematic and may lead to
differing interpretations and perceptions of the level of security system integration between different job
functions.
BACS Security Mitigation Practice
Results indicated that security management and building owners or operator professionals apply the
most BACS mitigation strategies; however, as with BACS vulnerabilities, these were rated relatively
equally and with limited variance. Therefore, findings suggests that security management professionals
believe they apply the greatest number of security mitigation strategies, although given their low level of
BACS responsibility and neutral understanding of BACS critical vulnerabilities, such an assertion is invalid.
Given the lack of revealed understanding of BACS criticalities and blanket approaches to security
mitigation, no clear conclusion of which mitigation strategies the professionals apply could reliably be
extracted. Nevertheless mitigation strategies were elicited from the expert group, who cited the five most
significant BACS mitigation strategies as procedures, security risk management (threat, security risk and
criticality assessments), continuity planning, security awareness and ITC security.
LIMITATIONS
There were several limitations identified in the study, such as terminology in language, distribution of
sample and understanding of practice through the survey method. The first limitations relates to
semantics and definitional issues. For example, differences in the term integration between security and
builder owner/operator professionals may stem from a lack of universal nomenclature. Even through the
data achieved a statically valid random population sample across the three associations, they were limited
17

even distribution across job function and the expert group was limited (n 10). In addition, survey logic
resulted in different sample sizes for different questions. Such a sampling limitation should be noted when
generalising findings.
No clear conclusion of what security mitigation strategies professionals apply could be extracted from the
data, nor was the study able to determine the ideal security measures used by security and building
owners or operator professionals. These issues were largely due to the homogenous rating of mitigation
strategies, which may have been facilitated by the design of the survey mitigation question. The question
asked participants whether they apply a particular mitigation strategy, which allowed them to select one
or more BACS architecture levels (or alternately, select ‘Don’t know’, although no respondent did this).
Such an approach may have given the impression that the question was asking the participants to list the
levels at which they believed the mitigation strategy should be applied. Although this may be a limitation
of the study that influenced more homogeneous ratings of mitigation strategies, it is also interesting that
no respondent used the ‘Don’t know’ option.
CONCLUSION
Intelligent Buildings or Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS) are becoming more common in
all parts of the built environment and its buildings. Increasing use of these systems are driven by the
cumulative commercial need for increased functionality and flow of information throughout the building,
to reduce operating costs, gain greater sustainability and have a more time responsive building. In
general, the building operator has portfolio responsibility for BACS; however, their focus or knowledge is
generally not the security of BACS. Therefore, there are potential significant security threats and risks
from BACS to the organisation through loss, denial or manipulation of information or services.
This study applied an online survey to a sample of the professional memberships of security and building
owners or operators associations to gather professionals’ understanding and knowledge of BACS
vulnerabilities and mitigation practices. The aim was to gain an understanding of both security and
building owners or operator’s comprehension and practice with BACS security.
The study found that the majority of the security management and building owners or operators had an
awareness of and included BACS in their risk registers, although both groups lacked robust technical
understanding. Professional understanding of a broad spectrum of BACS vulnerabilities were that they
were of equal criticality, with limited variance. There was a blanket or generic approach to all BACS
vulnerabilities, which resulted in strategies that were poorly targeted or provided limited risk mitigation.
As with BACS vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies were considered with limited variance.
In contrast, there emerged a group of technical professionals who demonstrated a robust understanding
of BACS vulnerabilities and resulting mitigation strategies, comprising of cybersecurity and technically
focused security participants such as integrators and engineering design professionals. For example, this
group rated BACS vulnerabilities with significant diversity (see Figure 5) across the BACS architectural
levels. Consequently, there needs to be a greater awareness from security management and building
owners or operators of BACS vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies that are risk based. In addition,
security management and facility professionals need to better use the knowledge that technical
professionals hold when considering BACS security at the design stage and ongoing management of built
environment security.
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